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REDUCING AN INVENTION TO PRACTICE.
There is one stage in the history of an invention to which
the law attaches especial significance. It is when the author
has made such progress in perfecting it as to acquire a right
to a patent, of which no one who comes after him can deprive
him, unless.he forfeits it by his negligence. He has not only
an indefeasible claim to the patent, but should any other per-
son obtain one, it will be utterly void. When he has so far
completed his invention, he is commonly said to have re-
duced it to practice. By this is meant something more than
a mere embodiment of it in a visible form. What is implied
in the phrase is. however, far from being well settled. A care-
fil study of the judicial decisions leaves it to some extent in
obscurity and doubt. The following pages will be devoted
to an examination of them, in order to see how far they have
determined it.
A brief examination of the English system will be of ma-
terial service in this undertaking. -As was remarked by
Judge STORY, in Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters 1: "Many of
the provisions of our Patent Act are derived from the prin-
ciples and practice which have prevailed in the construction
of that of England." "The construction of it adopted by
the English courts, and the principles and practice which
have long regulated the grants of their patents, as they must
have been known, and are tacitly referred to in some of the
rovisions of our own statute, afford materials to illustrate
it", P. 18.
By the statute, 21 Jac. I. c. 83, commonly called the Statute
of Monopolies, all exclusive privileges of the character thus
designated, both those already existing, and those which
should be afterward granted, were abolished and declared
utterly void, with a single exception. Patents for invention
were saved from the operation of the act under certain re-
strictions embraced in the 5th and 6th, sections. As the lat-
ter embodies the only conditions upon which such patents
can now be sustained, it has become customary to speak of
the law on this subject as if it were founded on the statute,
although it contains an express declaration that the grants
derive all their force from the common law. The clause in
the 6th section, which contains the restrictions in force at
this day, excepts from the condemnation pronounced by the
provisions of the act all patents "hereafter to be made of the
sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures
which others at the time of making such letters patent and
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grants shall not use." It is to this single clause that the
British courts have been accustomed to look in considering
the novelty of litigated inventions, and all their decisions on
that point have been made to rest upon the interpretation of
this language.
Two conditions are evidently prescribed by this act, and
it has always been held essential that they should be com-
plied with in order to render a patent valid. One is that the
patentee should be "the true and first inventor" of what was
embraced in his monopoly. It may be observed here that as
it had been considered before the passage of the law, that the
importer of an invention from abroad, which was "new within
the realm," might have a valid patent for it, although he ob-
tained it from others; so it was decided in Fdgqberry v. Ste-
ven, W. P. 0. 35, that he was included within the saving
provisions of the statute, and this ruling is still authoritative.
It is of more consequence to bear in mind that this condition
will not be held to have been broken, although others have
made the discovery previous to the patentee, provided he did
not obtain his knowledge of it from them, and they have not
put it in use, nor received a patent. As was said by Lord
LYNDHiuRsT, in Househill Co. v. "Neison, W. P. 0. 673: "The
first person who discloses that invention to the public is the
first invgentor." p. 719.
The other requisite to a valid monopoly is that "others did
not use" the invention at the time of its being granted. By
this it has been understood, also, that the supposed discovery
has not already come to the knowledge of the community,
The reason assigned for this is that the patent constitutes a"
contract between the patentee and the crown, the consider-
ation of which on the one part is the exclusive privilege con-
ferred on the grantee, and, on the other, the disclosi*e of a
new art or manufacture to the people. If the art or manu-
facture thus disclosed is already known, and not new, as, al-
leged, there is a failure of the consideration upon which the
grant was made, and it is therefore held to be void, as all
royal grants are when the representations upon which they
were obtained prove to be unfounded. If the invention has
been described in any published work before the date of the
patent, it is void. This will be the result, also, if it had been
in public use. The law to this effect was settled before the
stat. 21 Jac. 1, was enacted, and has ever since been recog-
nized. The condition has been incorporated into the patents
which contain a clause rendering them void if what is em-
braced in them "is not a new invention as to the public use
and exercise thereof." This clause has been embodied in the
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grant because it expresses an anciently establishea condition
upon which all monopolies depend.' No person ever inter-
polated such a condition without authority into a royal grant.
A conjecture has been thrown out whetLer it would not be
a sufficient objection to a patent to show that a machine like
that embraced in it had been constructed and exposed to ob-
servation before it was issued. (W. P. 0. 719, note.) On going
through all the English cases, however, not one can be found
in which such an objection has been sustained where the pre-
viously-constructed apparatus had not been employed in
actual work. The nearest approach which has been made to
a discussion of the subject was in Lewis v. Afarking, 1 W. P.
0C. 493. It there appeared that a machine dperating upon the
same principle as the plaintiff's had been brought over from
America, and had been seen by three or four persons before
the date of his patent. No exceptions were taken to the evi-
dence on the ground that it had been kept secret, though it
was said that if the plaintiff had seen it, or obtained a know-
ledge of the invention from it, it would have been fatal to his
suit. But Baron PARKE made this remark: "There is no
cage in which a patentee has been deprived of the benefit of
his invention, because another also had invented it, unless he
had also brought it into use." In the dearth of any decision
to the contrary, Baron PARKE'S remark may be considered as
embodying the English law on this point.
That the use must be in public is settled beyond all dis-
pute. It was resolved as early as 1766, in Dolland's Case,
W. P. C. 43; 2 H. B. 470; Day. Pat. Gas. 172. It was
shown by the defense that previous to the plaintiff's origi-
nating the optical instrument for which he had his patent,
another person had constructed one like it, and had used it.
"But it was holden that as Dr. Hall had confined it to his
closet, and thepublic were not acquainted with it, Dolland was
to be considered the first inventor." The question was fully
discussed also in Carpenter v. Smith, R. P. 0. 530; 5 M. and
W. 300, in which it was shown that a lock like that in con-
troversy had been placed upon a gate in a public way, where
it could be seen by every passenger. Upon a hearing before
the full bench, the court held that this was such a use in
public as must debar any one from ever after maintaining a
patent for it. At the same time they made the distinction
which has always been recognized, that thQre should be a use
in public, but not necessarily a use by the public, to give it
such an effect. The law established in th-e cases has never
been assailed, but has been uniformly adhered to in every
subsequent discussion of the subjcct.
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Wnere the plea is that the patentee is not the true and first
inventor, and evidence is given 6f the invention having been
practiced before it was originated by him, it may become ma-
terial to show that the practice of it was never discontinued.
If after having been in operation for a time it was given up
and relinquished, the presumption would be that it had
proved incomplete, and was therefore no bar to the patent,
It is a great mistake, however, to suppose, as it seems to have
been on some occasions, that the primary object of showing
that an invention had or 'had not been in continued public
use before the patent was obtained, is to establish, or
disprove the completeness of what is alleged to have been aprevious embodiment of the invention; or to suppose tbat
the publicity of such previous use has any bearing upon the
question. The claims of the patentee to be the prior invenm
tor are defeated as effectually by evidence that the formerauthor of the improvement continued to use it in private as
in public. And even when the question whether the patentee is
the first inventor is not under consideration, it is still incum-
bent on him to satisfy the triers that his discovery was not
in public use before he obtained his grant. Accordingly, in
Co~nish v. Keene, 1 W: P. 0. 512, the following language was
resorted to by the court, when speaking of what was claimed -
to have been a previous embodiment of the plaintiff's idea:
"If it was known at all to the world publicly, and practiced
openly, so that any other person might have the means of
acquiring a knowledge of it as well as this person who ob-
tained the patent, then the letters patent are void." A ques-tion may have been raised in this case whether the previous
employment of the device was not experimental; and the
evidence of its having been employed may have been sup-
posed to bear upon that question. But the above extractmakes it pl in that the evidence of its having been in public
use was introduced for an entirely different purpose-that of
showing that the alleged invention did not come within the
second condition prescribed by the Statute of Monopolies.
And there is not the least intimation throughout the report
that the question whether the former experiment was a com-
pleted one was affected in the slightest degree by the publicity
with which it was carried on after having been once insti-
tuted.
Another case which has been cited on this point is that of
Jones v. Pierce, 1 W. P. 0. 122, in which it would seem that
what was alleged to be an old embodiment of the invention
was also held to have been a mere experiment. (See Lord
ABINGER'S remark in Carpenter v. Smith, W. P. 0. 530.) If
REDUCING AN INVENTION TO PRACTICE.
the utterances of the learned judge who presided are correctly
set forth in the report, he was evidently somewhat confused
as to the different purposes for which such a prior emdodiment
might be shown, and did not distinguish between them. His
remarks are hardly entitled to any great weight in them-
selves, therefore, and they should never have been cited as an
authority on this subject, after the emphatic condemnation
pronounced upon his rulings by all the judges who expressed
their opinions before the House of Lords in the case of House-
hill Co. v. Neikson, W. P. C. 673. The following extract
from that of Lord BROUGHAX sufficiently exhibifs their senti-
ments: "But suppose it" (the previous invention) "was com-
plete, and suppose it is admitted not to have been a trial, then
it is one of the greatest errors that can be committed in point
of law, to say that with respect to such an invention as that,
it signifies one rush whether it was completely abandoned or
not, or whether it was continued to be used down to the very
date of the patent. Provided it was invented and publicly
used at the time, twenty or thirty years ago, in this case forty
years ago, it is perfectly immateril-not immaterial to the
second question, the second condition, namely, whether it was
used or not at the time of the granting of the patent, but
totally immaterial to the other question, which is equally
necessary to be ascertained in the inventor's favor, whether
or not he was the true and first inventor." p. 713. We learn
from this, it is true, that where it is attempted to be shown
that the invention was made by some one else before the pat-
entee, and was embodied in a working apparatus, proof that
the use of it was continued, or had been abandoned, may be-
come pertinent, as showing it was a perfected discovery on the
one hand, or an unsuccessful experiment on the other. Welearn
just as distinctly that independently of the issue whether the
patentee is the first inventor, and where there is no question
whether such previous apparatus was perfect or not, it is es-
sential for another purpose to determine whether such appa-
ratus was or was not in public use; that it is indispensable
that it should have been not only in use, but in public use, in
order to make it available as a defense. And there is not even an
intimation in Jones v. Pierce, far less in 7ousekill Co. v. Neil-
son, that the publicity of the use is considered to have any
bearing upon the inquiry whether such previous apparatus
was a perfect and completed discovery.
Where it appears that a patentee has manufactured by a
secret process, and sold the product before obtaining his pat-
ent, that will be pronounced a use in public. But no princi-
ple of law is better settled in England than this, that in order
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to avoid a patent on the ground that the invention was in use
by others, when it was granted, it must appear that the usewas in public. It is only by adhering strictly to this require-
ment that the public have an assurance that they shall be-
come possessed of the knowledge of the new art, and be ren-
dered certain of sharing the benefits of it.
The views of the profession in this country are by no
means so harmonious on this subject. Even the decisions of
the courts, on which we must chiefly rely, cannot always bb
reconciled. One principle may be considered as tolerably
well settled, although in conflict with sentiments which have
had an extensive prevalence. That principle ma' be thus
expressed:
I. In order to constitute a reduction to practice, the inven-
tion must have been embodied in a working. machine capa-
ble of being used for business purposes, or if not capable of
that, in something equivalent.
This was most emphatically asserted by Judge SPiAGU t
in Howe v. Underwood, 1 Fish. 160, in which he h eli
this language: "This is important to be understood, be-
cause'the idea has been carried all along, that if a pribr in-
ventor has gone to a certain extent, although he fall short of
making a complete machine, practically useful, those Who
come after have no right to secure to themselves the advan-
tage of the invention. This is not law." p. 166. The ques-
tion whether the previous invention was an abandoned ex-
perirnent was also raised in that case, but the passage here
quoted was announced as a maxim entirely independent ot
that consideration. The same learned judge had previously
exptessed his opinion, in Many v. Sizer, .1 Fish. 17, in this
manner : "Now experiment alone is not sufficient to consti-
tute priority of invention. The article must be completed
for public use, and the result must be known, although it is
not necessary that it should be actually used by the public."
p. 20. He evidently has in mind, in this last clause, the dis-
tinction constantly observed between a use in public, and,
what has always been regarded as unimportant, a use by the
public. To the same effect as these two de.cisions are the ob-
servations of Judge CLIFFORD, in &jnzOur v. Osborne, 11
Wall. 516: "He is the first iiiventor in the sense of the patent
laW, and entitled to a patent for his invention, who first per-
fected and adapted the same to use; and it is well settled
that, until the invention is so perfected and adapted to use, it
is not patentable under the patent law." p. 552. In PitM v.
Wemple, 2 Fish. 10, also it was said by DRUMMOND, J. of the
machine which was alleged to have anticipated the patentee's:
VoL. XX.-40.
